From Workforce Research to Workforce Policy
Ot to von Bismarck is reported to have said that laws are like sausages; it is better not to see them made. And like sausages, legislation is improved by quality ingredients. Rigorous research can be a vital ingredient that improves the fi nal policy and legislative product. The use of research to shape legislative development, however, should not be assumed. A forthcoming book published by the Upjohn Institute, Solving the Reemployment Puzzle: From Research to Policy (Wandner 2010) , traces the use and misuse of research as it informed and guided workforce public policy during the Clinton and George W. Bush presidencies. (To order the book, see the order form on the back cover or visit www.upjohn.org).
The new book closely examines the process by which eight social science experiments changed workforce development laws and policies. The experiments are analyzed through their entire policy process: experiment initiation, implementation, and evaluation; policy development; legislative enactment; program development; and program implementation.
The experiments all examined ways to return to work dislocated workers eligible to collect unemployment insurance (UI); hence, they were called the "UI Experiments."
The UI Experiments resulted in policy proposals and federal legislation despite a hostile economic, fi scal, and political environment. In some ways, they succeeded because they anticipated and surmounted the diffi cult environment of the 1980s.
The experiments operated under at least three important environmental constraints. First, they were developed during the early and mid-1980s, a period of high unemployment. Thus, there was a clear need to help the long-term unemployed return to work. Second, the experiments were conducted during a period of budget stringency. Conscious of fi scal constraints, the researchers designed the experiments to test whether the treatments could provide net benefi ts to the U.S. Department of Labor to enhance the chances that they could be enacted.
Third, the experiments operated in a partisan environment both within Congress and between Congress and the executive branch. Experimental methods were used precisely in order to yield rigorous results that all parties would fi nd convincing, since evaluations based on experimental methods are more likely to satisfy policymakers, regardless of their political philosophy. These methods are especially important in a time of divided and contentious government in order to enact into federal law new workforce policy that entails additional federal expenditures.
There are lessons to be learned from these experiments because they operated under many similar environmental constraints relating to diffi cult labor market conditions, severe federal and state budget constraints, and contentious governmental relations.
The UI Experiments: Policy Proposals and Legislation
Between 1986 and 1996, eight UI Experiments were conducted, searching comprehensively for new or improved interventions that might expedite workers' return to work and improve their work skills. The interventions tested were intensive job search assistance (JSA), training, relocation assistance, reemployment bonuses, self-employment assistance (SEA), and an enhanced UI work test.
The New Jersey Experiment was a multitreatment project that tested four interventions: 1) comprehensive job search assistance, 2) training, 3) relocation assistance, and 4) reemployment bonuses. The other experiments tested only one intervention: comprehensive JSA (District of Columbia and Florida), self-employment assistance (Massachusetts and Washington), reemployment bonuses (Pennsylvania and Washington), and an enhanced UI work test (Maryland).
Six of the experiments provided promising results that were developed into policy proposals (see Table 1 ). The comprehensive JSA from the New Jersey Experiment was used as the foundation for launching the Worker Profi ling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) system enacted into federal law in 1993. Later that year, SEA was temporarily enacted based on the interim report of the SEA experiment that had operated in Massachusetts. The SEA program was made permanent in 1998, after the fi nal SEA evaluation was published. In 1994, reemployment bonuses were incorporated into the Clinton administration's proposed Reemployment Act-a reauthorization of federal workforce legislation-but the legislation stalled in Congress and was never enacted. In 2003 and 2005, reemployment bonuses reemerged as a Bush administration legislative proposal in the form of Personal Reemployment Accounts.
The remainder of this article focuses on two interventions discussed in the book-comprehensive JSA and SEAwhere positive experimental results guided the design of federal legislation and produced successful programs that help the unemployed return to work.
The Case of Comprehensive Job Search Assistance
A series of reemployment experiments were proposed to Bill Brock after he Between 1986 and 1996, eight UI Experiments were conducted, searching for new or improved interventions that might expedite workers' return to work and improve their skills.
became Secretary of Labor in April 1985. Brock had been Special Trade Representative and was familiar with the issue of worker dislocation. He eagerly approved a budget proposal to launch a set of experiments dealing with dislocated workers, but he insisted that the New Jersey Experiment begin immediately using existing research funds rather than wait for a new congressional appropriation. Believing strongly in research, Brock fi rmly supported initiating the experiments, though he knew he would not oversee their completion as secretary.
The New Jersey Experiment was conducted in 1986 and 1987, and the fi nal evaluation was completed two years later (Corson et al. 1989) . The evaluation showed that comprehensive JSA reduced UI-compensated durations by half a week to all workers offered the treatment. The treatment resulted in a fi nding that the cost of providing the services would be more than offset by the benefi ts to the government. If policymakers were convinced by the evaluation report, comprehensive JSA could be provided with a federal budgetary savings.
The fi ndings from the 1989 evaluation and a series of multiyear follow-up reports were widely circulated. Briefi ngs were held in Washington, DC, for each of the evaluation reports. The reports were distributed to state workforce agencies, researchers, policy analysts, and policymakers. At a 1991 briefi ng of minority and majority staff members of the House Ways and Means Committee, all members agreed that the experimental evaluation results were convincing and that comprehensive JSA was highly cost effective.
In March 1993, less than a month after becoming the Secretary of Labor, Robert Reich was faced with high unemployment requiring the extension of emergency UI benefi ts. In response, he wanted to do something innovative. Cognizant of the results of the New Jersey experiment from her time as UI Administrator, Carolyn Golding, the acting assistant secretary for the Employment and Training Administration, suggested he consider comprehensive JSA. Larry Katz, Reich's chief economist, supported the proposal-he had read the New Jersey Experiment evaluation and had used it as a reading for his Harvard graduate labor economics class. Reich's chief of staff, Kitty Higgins, supported the proposal, having been briefed on the experiment when she was legislative assistant to Representative Sander Levin, who served on the House Ways and Means Committee.
Clinton approved the proposal, and Congress enacted the extension of emergency benefi ts with the JSA provisions with bipartisan support. Clinton signed the legislation into law on March 4, 1993. Now the Labor Department was charged with implementing this new program in the states.
With unprecedented support from three key department programs-the UI, Employment Service (ES), and training programs-the WPRS system was successfully implemented nationwide by mid-1996. A newly developed worker profi ling statistical mechanism allowed state UI programs to identify UI benefi ciaries who were permanently displaced and likely to exhaust their UI benefi ts. Targeted workers were referred to One-Stop Career Centers where ES workers provided them with reemployment services, and some of these workers were referred to training programs.
In recent years the WPRS system has screened 6-12 million UI benefi ciaries and has referred over 1.0 million of these UI benefi ciaries to the One-Stops to receive WPRS reemployment services. The WPRS system works as both a targeting tool to identify workers in need of reemployment services and as an allocation tool to effectively provide these services consistent with state and local workforce budgetary constraints.
Self-Employment Assistance
SEA was tested in Massachusetts, providing self-employment allowances to UI-eligible workers in lieu of regular UI benefi ts. This intervention also was found to provide net benefi ts to the Department of Labor. SEA was a fundamental change in the way that UI benefi ts are paid. While regular UI requires that unemployed workers search for wage and salary employment, the SEA program relaxes that requirement and allows workers to draw benefi ts as long as they are laboring full time to For research to affect policy, political leaders in both the executive branch and Congress must commit to funding, conducting, and using research.
start their own businesses. Unemployed workers create their own jobs by starting microenterprises, and they may employ other workers as well.
SEA was the other UI Experiment that both yielded a Clinton administration legislative proposal and was enacted into federal law. SEA is a voluntary state program that must be adopted by individual states and made a part of their state UI laws. Less than a dozen states have adopted the program, and usage has been limited to a few thousand workers a year. Nevertheless, the SEA program holds promise as a practical option for some workers to create their own jobs and, based on experimental results, to earn more money than workers who are not offered this option.
Conclusion
Rigorous research can have a major impact on federal workforce public policy and legislation. For research to affect policy, political leaders in both the executive branch and Congress must commit to funding, conducting, and using research. Implementing research fi ndings requires that government workers at the national, state, and local levels be supportive of the research results and use them to develop new and innovative programs and processes. When policymakers use research results as a prominent ingredient in policymaking, they are more likely to develop costeffective policy that works. However, when the research is not conducted or the research results are ignored, policy and programs suffer.
WPRS and SEA are success stories. WPRS helps expedite the return to work of dislocated workers. The Obama administration and Congress recognized this contribution by including $250 million in Recovery Act funds for reemployment service grants that have provided funds to provide comprehensive JSA. While the SEA program needs more encouragement and more entrepreneurial training funds to expand its scope, its success in the states with SEA programs demonstrates the promise of permitting unemployed workers to create their own jobs and to increase their earnings by starting their own microenterprises.
